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strictures of the American Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act),
which forbade the transfer of American
scientific and technological knowledge
of the atomic weapon to any other
power, Anglo-American nuclear intelligence cooperation nevertheless went
ahead. These two governments used
this intelligence to predict outcomes,
and what proved to be even more successful, the detection of Soviet nuclear
weapons testing.
Goodman’s narrative of this effort focuses on long-distance monitoring, as
well as acoustic, seismographic, and
electromagnetic monitoring of the Soviets’ nuclear weapons program. This is,
in itself, an excellent insight into the
Cold War nuclear intelligence from
1945 to 1958, an invaluable mirror into
these efforts.
What sets this work apart, however, is
Goodman’s placement of what is essentially one mirror behind another—his
revelation of the strategic implications
of nuclear intelligence-sharing on the
Anglo-American special relationship itself, along with the impact of that relationship on the Soviet Union. To
understand the dynamics involved,
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass is worth recalling, as Alice declares that it is like a huge game of chess
that is being played all over the world.
But what of the Soviet Union, the conventionally understood object of all the
covert intelligence monitoring and detection efforts? Goodman answers this
question in his conclusion. He argues
that while extensive literature exists on
the Soviet threat and the American perception of it, these works often deal
with what he calls an alleged “bomber
gap” and “missile gap.” He states that
“both gaps were figments in the
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imagination of the U.S. intelligence
community, based in the main on overstating the Soviet potential in order to
procure greater funds for military development.” While this is a standard
critique, Goodman applies what he
terms “counterfactual history,” a third
look into the mirror behind the mirror.
Counterfactual history, he argues, “is a
tool that often can be used to great effect. The Soviet Union, it seems, would
never have seriously contemplated war
with the West. Given the American
atomic arsenal, it is also unlikely that
even if Britain had not developed a nuclear deterrent, the Soviet Union would
ever have dared risk war.” Goodman
then measures the capabilities-tointentions calculus so familiar to students of the Naval War College, as follows: “In the minds of those who
mattered, Soviet capabilities were intimately linked to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, while the Soviets were without the capability to wage war, their intentions were perceived to be far less
aggressive.”
Goodman has produced a definitive
work, in that it validates the United
Kingdom’s unequivocal commitment to
an independent nuclear deterrent, and
by doing so he has given us a seminal
work, a landmark effort in its devotion
to prodigious research and commitment to truthful inquiry.
MYRON GREENBERG

Defense Contract Management Agency
Aeronautical Systems Division Ohio River Valley
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Kremlinologists were noteworthy for
describing decision making in the USSR
as comparable to cats fighting under a
large rug in a dark room—the only
thing the outside world could clearly
and correctly see was the emerging winner of the struggle. Robert Brannon’s
Russian Civil-Military Relations suggests
that while Russia’s transition from autocracy to nascent democracy has offered observers more transparency,
some of the byzantine intrigues remain.
While Brannon summarizes his hypothesis on the evolution of Russian
civil-military relations using politicalscience theoretical literature, this book
is all about the three case studies that
Brannon brings to life, using his professional notes, along with interviews of
the principals and of experts on the
subject. The author was in position to
know many of the study’s protagonists,
serving as the U.S. naval attaché to Russia from 1998 to 2001. His proximity to
his subjects, however, does not blur his
vision. If anything, his harshest appraisals are directed at his closest Russian
counterparts.
Brannon illustrates his understanding
of Russian civil-military relations by examining the Russian race to Pristina
during the Kosovo conflict (1999), the
second Russian intervention in
Chechnya (1999), and the tragic sinking
of the submarine Kursk (2000). His
writing style enables the casual reader
to follow the exciting plots of the episodes with relative ease, each building
on the previous story. Some of the juiciest material is in the footnotes, in which
Brannon recounts personal tales of harrowing experiences in exotic Russian
locales.
This is a book about a subject never
widely discussed in the Western press.
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During the Bolshevik and communist
eras, the Soviet military was slavishly
controlled and obedient to domineering
and “intrusive” civil authorities, rendering most civil-military discussions
irrelevant. However, the relationship of
Russian political and military leaders
after the fall of the Soviet Union is at
best problematic and at worst threatening. Samuel Huntington (the famous
American political scientist) held that
for a military establishment to act as a
profession, it must possess expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.
Brannon argues that the Russian military leadership, while often both incompetent and deceptive, has
consistently held to the belief that Russia should be suspicious of American
and NATO intentions, whereas the Russian military itself remains strong and
assertive, possessing the power to influence international affairs. In other
words, with all its flaws, it is a distinct
professional organization. However, the
author makes a persuasive critique of
Russia’s political leadership in the
1990s. The military adventurism documented in the three case studies may
have been caused largely by the Boris
Yeltsin administration’s fecklessness
while facing budding national security
struggles. Military men may simply
have been acting as Russian patriots in
the face of a political vacuum.
However, the book comes up short in
two areas. First, because Russia is
unique, it is questionable whether its
experience sheds much light on the development of civil-military relations in
other postcommunist societies. Second,
one of the book’s central messages is
that the Russian military is in need of
reform. Yet as the United States has
witnessed over the last decade, terms
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like “reform” and “transformation”
mean different things to different parties. Brannon never makes clear what he
means by his Holy Grail of “reform.”
Brannon sees in Vladimir Putin (and
the Dimitri Medvedev–Putin team) the
political leadership missing in the
1990s. He suggests that the military is
more likely to give its aggressive support and obedience to decisive nationalists who support military reform. This
may be both the good and the bad news
of this provocative study.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. New
York: Penguin, 2009. 926pp. $40

This final volume of Richard Evans’s
trilogy on the Third Reich (the earlier
titles being The Coming of the Third
Reich, 2003, and The Third Reich in
Power, 1933–1939, 2005) is a disquieting masterpiece of scholarship. Although many of the events recounted
here will be familiar to most readers,
Evans accomplishes the seemingly impossible by merging both the high politics (if one can use that term in
describing Hitler’s Germany) with the
best in contemporary social history of
the Third Reich. This sordid story has
never been told so powerfully or from
so many different perspectives. The
voices of the victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders, along with those of the architects of the conquest and genocide,
are all heard in chilling detail.
Evans notes that Hitler’s Operation
T-4, his “euthanasia action” program,
directed against disabled, mentally ill,
and incurably sick Germans, laid the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

169

foundation for the more dramatic,
Europe-wide extermination programs. To relieve the sense of despair
that permeates this book, one
searches for heroes, but they are few
in number. The sporadic camp and
ghetto uprisings were clearly heroic,
as was the resistance by such tiny
groups as the “White Rose” movement. Although the Roman Catholic
bishop Clemens von Galen led the effort to halt the T-4 program, Evans
notes that the bishop was silent when
it came to the regime’s treatment of
Jews and Gypsies. Hitler learned a
valuable lesson from the T-4 episode:
limit the paper trail and speak in euphemisms when dealing with statesponsored extermination programs.
There was, of course, resistance to
Hitler among some members of the
officer corps, men whose sense of
honor led them to recoil from the
atrocities they witnessed in the war in
the East. Another group, composed of
theologians, lawyers, and some socialist politicians, known to the Gestapo
as the Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisau Circle), failed to merge with the military
resisters, thus further diminishing the
already long odds that Hitler could be
deposed.
Unfortunately, more often than not, ordinary Germans reveled in Hitler’s early
victories and seemed to endorse, or at
least tolerate, Hitler’s annihilation policies. The notion that ordinary Germans
were unaware of the atrocities committed in their name is laughable. For instance, in the fall of 1939 German
officers and enlisted men wrote home
of the incredible “dirt” and “filth” they
encountered among the “subhuman”
Poles; they began to exterminate parts
of the population within days of the
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